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ABSTRACT
Economists working with numerical solutions to the optimal consumption/saving problem under
uncertainty have long known that there are quantitatively important interactions between liquidity
constraints and precautionary saving behavior. This paper provides the analytical basis for those
interactions. First, we explain why the introduction of a liquidity constraint increases the precautionary
saving motive around levels of wealth where the constraint becomes binding. Second, we provide a
rigorous basis for the oft-noted similarity between the effects of introducing uncertainty and introducing
constraints, by showing that in both cases the effects spring from the concavity in the consumption
function which either uncertainty or constraints can induce. We further show that consumption function
concavity, once created, propagates back to consumption functions in prior periods. Finally, our most
surprising result is that the introduction of additional constraints beyond the first one, or the introduction
of additional risks beyond a first risk, can actually reduce the precautionary saving motive, because the
new constraint or risk can ‘hide’ the effects of the preexisting constraints or risks.
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In the past decade, numerical solutions to the optimal consumption/saving problem
have become the standard theoretical tool for modelling consumption behavior. Nu-
merical solutions have become popular because analytical solutions are not available
for realistic descriptions of utility and uncertainty, nor for the plausible case where
consumers face both liquidity constraints and uncertainty.
A drawback to numerical solutions, however, is that often it is diﬃcult to determine
why results come out the way they do. A leading example of this problem crops up
in the relationship between precautionary saving behavior and liquidity constraints.
At least since Zeldes (1984), economists working with numerical solutions have known
that liquidity constraints can induce precautionary saving even by consumers with
quadratic utility functions that provide no inherent precautionary saving motive. Sim-
ulations have also sometimes found that liquidity constraints boost the eﬀect of risk on
saving even when the utility function already induces a precautionary saving motive.1
On the other hand, simulation results have sometimes seemed to suggest that liquidity
constraints and precautionary saving are substitutes rather than complements. For ex-
ample, Samwick (1995) has shown that unconstrained consumers with a precautionary
saving motive in a retirement saving model behave in ways qualitatively and quantita-
tively similar to the behavior of liquidity constrained consumers facing no uncertainty.
This paper provides the theoretical tools needed to make sense of the interactions
between liquidity constraints and precautionary saving. These tools provide a rigor-
ous theoretical foundation that can be used to clarify the reasons for the numerical
literature’s apparently contrasting ﬁndings.
For example, one of the paper’s simpler points is a proof that when a liquidity
constraint is added to the standard consumption problem, the resulting value function
exhibits increased prudence around the level of wealth where the constraint becomes
binding. (Kimball (1990) deﬁnes prudence of the value function and shows that it is the
key theoretical requirement to produce precautionary saving.) The essential logic for
why a liquidity constraint can induce precautionary saving is relatively straightforward.
Constrained agents have less ﬂexibility in responding to shocks because the eﬀects of
the shocks cannot be spread out over time; thus risk has a bigger negative eﬀect on
expected utility (or value) for constrained agents than for unconstrained agents. The
precautionary saving motive is heightened by the desire (in the face of risk) to make
such constraints less likely to bind.
At a deeper level, we also show that the eﬀect of a constraint on prudence is an
example of a more general theoretical result: Prudence is induced by concavity of
the consumption function. Since a constraint causes consumption concavity around
the point where the constraint binds, adding a constraint necessarily boosts prudence
1For a detailed but nontechnical discussion of simulation results on the relation between liquidity
constraints and precautionary saving, see Carroll (2001).
1around that point. We show that this concavity-boosts-prudence result holds not just
for quadratic utility functions but for any utility function in the Hyperbolic Abso-
lute Risk Aversion (HARA) class (which includes Constant Relative Risk Aversion,
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, and most other commonly used forms).
These results tie in closely with ﬁndings in our previous paper, Carroll and Kim-
ball (1996), which shows that within the HARA class, the introduction of uncertainty
causes the consumption function to become strictly concave (in the absence of con-
straints) for all but a few carefully chosen combinations of utility function and uncer-
tainty. Indeed, taken together, the results of the two papers can be seen as establishing
rigorously the sense in which precautionary saving and liquidity constraints are very
close substitutes.2 In this paper, in fact, we provide an example of a speciﬁc kind of
uncertainty that (under CRRA utility, in the limit) induces a consumption function
that is pointwise identical to the consumption function that would be induced by the
addition of a liquidity constraint.
We further show that, once consumption concavity is induced (either by a con-
straint or by uncertainty), it propagates back to periods before the period in which the
concavity is ﬁrst created.3 But in the quadratic utility case the propagation is rather
subtle: the prior-period consumption rules are concave (and prudence is higher) at any
level of wealth from which it is possible that the constraint will bind, but also possible
that it may not bind. Precautionary saving takes place in such circumstances because
a bit more saving can reduce the probability that the constraint will bind.
The fact that precautionary saving arises from the possibility that constraints might
bind may help to explain why such a high percentage of households cite precautionary
motives as the most important reason for saving (Kennickell and Lusardi (1999)) even
though the fraction of households who report actually having been constrained in the
past is relatively low (Jappelli (1990)).
Our ﬁnal theoretical contribution is to show that the introduction of further liq-
uidity constraints beyond the ﬁrst one may actually reduce precautionary saving by
‘hiding’ the eﬀects of the preexisting constraint(s); identical logic implies that uncer-
tainty can hide the eﬀects of a constraint, because the consumer may need to save so
much for precautionary reasons that the constraint becomes irrelevant. For example, a
typical perfect foresight model of retirement consumption for a consumer with Social
Security income implies that the legal constraint on borrowing against Social Security
beneﬁts will cause the consumer to run assets down to zero, then set consumption equal
to income for the remainder of life. Now consider adding the possibility of large medical
expenses near the end of life (e.g. nursing home fees). Under reasonable assumptions
the consumer may save enough against this risk to render the constraint irrelevant.
2See Fernandez-Corugedo (2000) for a related demonstration that ‘soft’ liquidity constraints bear
an even closer resemblance to precautionary behavior.
3Our previous paper showed that the concavity induced by uncertainty propagated backwards, but
the proofs in that paper cannot be applied to concavity created by a liquidity constraint.
2The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To ﬁx notation and ideas, the
next section presents a very brief review of the logic of precautionary saving in the
standard case (without liquidity constraints). The third section sets out our general
theoretical framework. The fourth section shows that concavity of the consumption
function heightens prudence. The ﬁfth section shows how concavity, whether induced
by constraints or uncertainty, propagates to previous periods. Section 6 shows how
the introduction of a constraint creates a precautionary saving motive for consumers
with quadratic utility, and how that precautionary motive propagates backwards; it
also shows that the introduction of additional liquidity constraints beyond the ﬁrst
constraint does not necessarily further increase (and can even reduce) the precautionary
motive at any given level of wealth. The next section examines the eﬀects of introducing
a constraint when utility is of the CRRA form, and contains our example in which a
constraint and uncertainty have identical eﬀects on the consumption function. It uses
this example to make the point that introduction of uncertainty can hide the eﬀects of
constraints or preexisting uncertainty. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 A Brief Review
We begin with a very brief review of the logic of precautionary saving in the two-
period case; with minor modiﬁcations this two-period model is directly applicable to
the multiperiod case when the second period utility function is interpreted as the value
function arising from optimal behavior from time t +1o n .
Consider a consumer with initial wealth wt who anticipates uncertain future income
yt+1. This consumer solves the unconstrained optimization problem4
max
{ct}




u(wt − st)+Et [Vt+1(st +˜ yt+1)]. (2)
The familiar ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is to set u (ct)=Et[V

t+1(wt − ct +
˜ yt+1)] or, equivalently, u (wt − st)=Et[V

t+1(st +˜ yt+1)].
Figure 1 shows a standard example of this problem in which both u and Vt+1 are
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions. The consumer is assumed
to start period t with amount of wealth wt. The horizontal axis represents the choice
of how much the consumer saves in period t, and the upward-sloping curve labelled
4Here and henceforth we use a ∼ to designate those variables inside an expectations operator
whose value is uncertain as of the date at which the expectation is taken. Hence, since yt+1’s value is
uncertain as of time t, it is written as ˜ yt+1 on the RHSof (1).









Figure 1: Determining Consumption in the Two Period Case Given Initial Wealth wt
u (wt−st) reﬂects the period-t marginal utility of the consumption (wt−st) associated
with that choice of saving. The downward-sloping curve labelled V

t+1(st + y) reﬂects
the marginal value the consumer would experience in period t+1 as a function of saving
st in the previous period if she were perfectly certain to receive income y = Et[˜ yt+1]
in period t + 1. This curve is downward-sloping as a function of st because the more
the consumer saves in period t, the more is available for consumption in period t +1
and thus the lower is the marginal utility of spending in t+1. In this perfect-certainty
case, the utility-maximizing level of consumption is found at the point of intersection
between the u
(wt−st)a n dt h eV

t+1(st+y) curves, i.e. the level of saving that equalizes
the current and future marginal utility of consumption. In the CRRA case where the
period-utility functions u(c)a n dVt+1(wt+1) are identical, the optimal solution is to
consume exactly half of total lifetime resources in the ﬁrst period; the point labelled ¯ s
reﬂects this level of saving.
In the case where period t + 1 income is uncertain, ﬁrst-period marginal utility
must be equated to the expectation of the second-period marginal value function. That
expectation will be a convex combination of the marginal values associated with each
possible outcome, where the weights on each outcome are given by the probability of
that outcome. For illustration, suppose there is a 0.5 probability that the consumer will
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Figure 2: Construction of Et[V

t+1]
probability of each outcome is 1/2, the consumer’s expected marginal value function for





t+1(st +¯ y − η). Figure 2 illustrates the construction of the Et[V

t+1(st +˜ yt+1)]
curve; for example, if the consumer chooses to save st = s, then her expected marginal
value in the second period is given by .5V

t+1(¯ s + y + η)+.5V

t+1(¯ s + y − η), as shown
in the ﬁgure.
The expected marginal value function traced out by this convex combination of the
good and bad outcomes is reproduced and labelled Et[V

t+1(st +˜ yt+1)] in ﬁgure 1. The
optimal level of saving s∗ under uncertainty is simply the level of st at the intersection
of u (wt − st)a n dEt[V

t+1(st +˜ yt+1)], where the ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed. The
magnitude of precautionary saving is the amount by which saving rises from the riskless
case (¯ s)t ot h er i s k yc a s e( s∗).
Figure 2 illustrates the simple point that the magnitude of precautionary saving is
related to the degree of convexity of the marginal value function. Jensen’s inequality
guarantees that if V

t+1 is strictly convex, then Et[V

t+1(st +˜ yt+1)] >V

t+1(st + Et[˜ yt+1])
and consequently the intersection with u (wt − st) will occur at a higher value of ﬁrst-
period saving. Clearly, if V

t+1 were linear (as is true in the case of quadratic utility in
the absence of liquidity constraints), mean-zero risks in period t + 1 would not aﬀect
the expectation of the marginal value function, because the curve generated by the
5‘convex combination’ would lie atop the original marginal value function. Thus, the
convexity in the marginal value function creates a precautionary saving motive.
Formally, Kimball (1990) shows that the prudence of the value function (deﬁned
as −V    (w)/V   (w)) measures the convexity of the marginal value function at w and
therefore the intensity of the precautionary saving motive at that point. To be precise,
given two diﬀerent value functions V (w)a n dˆ V (w), if the absolute prudence of ˆ V (w)
is greater than for V (w)—that is, if −ˆ V    (w)/ˆ V   (w) > −V    (w)/V   (w)– then the
addition of a risk causes a greater rightward shift of expected ˆ V (w) than of expected
V (w). As ﬁgure 2 suggests, a greater rightward shift tends to produce a greater increase
in precautionary saving.
To analyze the multiperiod case, we need to be able to characterize the degree of
convexity of the marginal value function or the prudence of the value function itself.5
3 The Setup
Before stating and proving our main theorems, we need to lay out the basic setup
of the consumption/saving problem with many periods. Consider a consumer who
faces some future risks but is not subject to any current or future liquidity constraints.
Assume that the consumer is maximizing the time-additive present discounted value
of utility from consumption u(c). Denoting the (possibly stochastic) gross interest rate
and time preference factors as ˜ Rt ∈ (0,∞)a n d˜ βt ∈ (0,∞), respectively, and labelling
consumption ct, stochastic labor income yt, and gross wealth (inclusive of period-t labor
5In order to use the prudence of the value function to gauge the eﬀect of a risk in labor income at
time t + 1, we implicitly assume that this risk is independent of all the other risks realized in periods
beyond t + 1 that are already built into the shape of Vt+1. In other words, the eﬀect of labor income
on the value function must work entirely through its eﬀect on wealth at time t +1 . T h e r ea r et w o
possible approaches when the realization of yt+1 is correlated with future risks, incomes, or rates of
return. First, each period could be decomposed into two transitions, one where the information is
revealed about the distribution of future incomes, rates of return, etc. and a second where the labor
income at time t + 1 is revealed. The other approach, which, when possible, is more powerful, is to
capitalize all the future eﬀects of a shock into wealth at time t + 1. This approach is possible when
the news revealed is mathematically equivalent to a particular eﬀect on the quantity of an asset in
the model.















s.t. wt+1 = Rt+1(wt − ct)+yt+1.




u(ct)+Et[˜ βt+1Vt+1( ˜ Rt+1(wt − ct)+˜ yt+1)]. (4)
Deﬁning
Ωt(st)=Et[˜ βt+1Vt+1( ˜ Rt+1st +˜ yt+1)] (5)
where st = wt − ct is the portion of period t resources saved, this becomes8
Vt(wt)=m a x
{ct}
u(ct)+Ω t(wt − ct). (6)









In words, ˘ ct(µt) (‘c-breve’) indicates the level of consumption which yields marginal
utility µt (note the mnemonic convenience of deﬁning marginal utility as the Greek
6We allow for a stochastic discount factor because some problems which contain a stochastic scaling
variable (such as permanent income) can be analyzed more easily by dividing the problem through by
the scale variable; this division induces a term that eﬀectively plays the role of a stochastic discount
factor.
7The analysis here is similar in some respects to the analysis in Carroll and Kimball (1996); see
that paper for more detailed discussion of the methods used below.
8For notational simplicity we express the value function Vt(wt) and the expected discounted value
function Ωt(st) as functions simply of wealth and savings, but implicitly these functions reﬂect the
entire information set as of time t; if, for example, the income process is not i.i.d., then information
on lagged income or income shocks could be important in determining current optimal consumption.
In the remainder of the paper the dependence of functions on the entire information set as of time
t will be unobtrusively indicated, as here, by the presence of the t subscript. For example, we will
call the policy rule in period t which indicates the optimal value of consumption ct(wt). In contrast,
because we assume that the utility function is the same from period to period, the utility function
has no t subscript.
7letter spelled mu), ˘ st(µt) indicates the level of end-of-period savings9 in period t that
yields a discounted expected marginal value of µt,a n d˘ wt(µt) indicates the level of
beginning-of-period wealth that would yield marginal value of µt assuming optimal
(though potentially constrained) disposition of that wealth between consumption and
saving.10 In the absence of a liquidity constraint in period t, these deﬁnitions imply
that for an optimizing consumer whose optimal choice of consumption in period t yields
marginal utility µt,
ct =˘ ct(µt), (10)
st =˘ st(µt), (11)
wt =˘ wt(µt). (12)
In the presence of a liquidity constraint that requires st ≥ 0, equation (11) becomes:
st =m a x [ 0 ,˘ st(µt)]. (13)
Note that the budget constraint wt = ct + st allows us to write:
˘ wt(µt)=˘ ct(µt)+m a x [ 0 , ˘ st(µt)]. (14)
4 Prudence and the Concavity of the Consumption
Function
Our ultimate goal is to understand the relationship between liquidity constraints and
precautionary saving behavior. As noted above, the magnitude of precautionary saving
depends on the absolute prudence of the value function. We begin this section by
showing that the absolute prudence of the value function will be greater whenever the
consumption function is concave (as opposed to linear); later we will tie constraints
to concavity (and therefore to prudence) by showing that the imposition of liquidity
constraints concaviﬁes the consumption function.
Our analysis of the concavity of the consumption function is couched in general
terms, and therefore applies whether the source of consumption concavity is liquidity
constraints or something else. This generality is useful, because there is a compelling
candidate for the ‘something else’: uncertainty. Carroll and Kimball (1996) show
that the introduction of uncertainty into an optimization problem without preexisting
uncertainty or constraints causes the consumption function to become strictly concave
9We use the word ‘savings’ to indicate the level of wealth remaining in a period after that period’s
consumption has occurred; ‘savings’ is therefore a stock variable, and is distinct from ‘saving’ which
is the diﬀerence between income and consumption.
10We chose the slightly unusual breve accent (˘) because of its rough resemblance to the shape of
marginal utility µ, which is the argument for the breve-accented functions.
8for most combinations of utility function and uncertainty. Our treatment here will
therefore alternate between discussion of the eﬀects of imposing liquidity constraints
and the eﬀects of introducing uncertainty. Our treatment thus provides the analytical
foundation for the qualitative similarity between the eﬀects of liquidity constraints and
of uncertainty that has been known from simulation results since Zeldes (1984).
4.1 When Is the Consumption Function Linear?
Our method in this section will be to compare prudence in a baseline case where the
consumption function ct(wt) is linear to prudence in a modiﬁed situation in which the
consumption function ˆ ct(wt)i sc o n c a v e .
Carroll and Kimball (1996) prove that for utility functions in the HARA class, in
the absence of liquidity constraints the consumption function will be linear (c  
t(wt)=0 )
only in three cases: when utility is of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
form u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ) and the only future risk is multiplicative (i.e. rate-of-return
risk);11 when utility is of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) form u(c)=
−(1/a)e−ac and the only future risk is additive (i.e. labor income risk); and when the
utility function is quadratic, u(c)=−(α/2)(c−κ)2.12 Thus, the natural baseline cases
to consider are the three HARA cases where the consumption function is linear.
4.2 How Does Concavity of the Consumption Function Heighten
Prudence?
4.2.1 The CRRA Case
Our ﬁrst baseline ct(wt) will be the linear consumption function that arises under
CRRA utility in the absence of labor income risk or constraints.13 Below (in sec-
tion 6) we show that imposing a constraint makes the consumption function in the
constraint-modiﬁed situation ˆ ct(wt) concave. Similarly, Carroll and Kimball (1996)
show that the addition of labor income risk renders the risk-modiﬁed consumption rule
concave. In either case it is possible to show that as wealth approaches inﬁnity the
consumption rule in the modiﬁed situation approaches the consumption rule in the
baseline situation. When the experiment is the imposition of a liquidity constraint,
11The consumption function when utility is CRRA with a shifted origin, u(c)=( c−κ)1−γ/(1−γ),
is not linear when there is multiplicative risk, as can be seen from the ﬁrst order condition for the
penultimate period of life when β =1 :( cT−1 − κ)−γ = ET−1[( ˜ RT(wT−1 − cT−1) − κ)−γ] implying
that cT−1 −κ = {ET−1[( ˜ RT(wT−1 −cT−1) −κ)−γ]}−1/γ which has no linear solution for cT−1 unless
κ =0 .
12See section 4.2.3 for a demonstration that the consumption rule is linear under quadratic utility
in the presence of both labor income and rate-of-return risk.
13The analysis below goes through even if there is rate-of-return risk in the problem, so long as the
rate-of-return risk is not modiﬁed when the labor income risk is added.
9the reason ˆ ct(wt) approaches ct(wt) is that as wealth approaches inﬁnity the constraint
becomes irrelevant because the probability that it will ever bind becomes zero. When
the treatment is the addition of labor income risk, ˆ ct(wt) approaches ct(wt) because as
wealth approaches inﬁnity the portion of future consumption that the consumer plans
on ﬁnancing out of the uncertain labor income stream becomes vanishingly small.14
Formally, we can capture both the liquidity constraint and the precautionary saving
cases with the assertion that
lim
wt→∞
ˆ c(wt) − c(wt)=0 .
Theorem 1 Consider an agent who has a utility function with u (c) > 0, u  (c) < 0,
u   (c) > 0 and nonincreasing absolute prudence −u   (c)/u  (c) in two diﬀerent situa-
tions. If optimal consumption in the baseline situation is described by a neoclassical
consumption function ct(wt) that is linear, while optimal behavior in the modiﬁed situ-
ation (indicated by a hat) is described by a concave neoclassical consumption function
ˆ ct(wt) and if lim
wt→+∞
ˆ ct(wt) − ct(wt)=0 , then at any given level of wealth wt the value
function in the modiﬁed situation exhibits greater absolute prudence than the value
function in the baseline situation. Prudence in the modiﬁed situation is strictly greater
at wt than in the baseline situation if and only if the consumption function is strictly
concave at some wealth level at or above wt.
Proof. By the envelope theorem, the marginal value of wealth is always equal to
the marginal utility of consumption as long as it is possible to spend current wealth








 (ˆ ct(wt)). (16)










  (ˆ ct(wt))ˆ c
 
t(wt). (18)
Taking another derivative can run afoul of possible discontinuity in ˆ c 
t(wt), but to
establish intuition it is useful to consider ﬁrst the case where ˆ c  
t(wt) exists; we will
14Since in the CRRA case the proportionate eﬀect of risk on consumption depends on the square
of the standard deviation of the risk relative to wealth, as this ratio gets small as wealth approaches
inﬁnity, the absolute size of the eﬀect of the risk in reducing consumption approaches zero.
15Since ˆ c(wt) is concave, it has left-hand and right-hand derivatives at every point, though the left-
hand and right-hand derivatives may not be equal. Equation (18) should be interpreted accordingly




t ) > ˆ c 
t(w
+
t ); therefore V   (w
−
t ) <V  (w
+
t )).
10then adapt the proof for the case where ˆ c  



















where the second line follows because with a linear consumption function c  
t(wt)=0 .
Thus,









































(ˆ ct(wt))[ˆ c 
t(wt)]2 + u  (ˆ ct(wt))[ˆ c
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t(wt)]





























As can be seen from Figure 3,16 the assumption that the two consumption functions
converge asymptotically, lim
wt→+∞
ˆ ct(wt)−ct(wt)=0 , together with the linearity of ct(wt)
and concavity of ˆ ct(wt), guarantees that the marginal propensity to consume is higher
and the level of consumption lower in the modiﬁed situation: Thus ˆ c 
t(wt) ≥ c 
t(wt)a n d
ˆ ct(wt) ≤ ct(wt). The inequalities are strict if there is any strictness to the concavity of
ˆ ct(·)a ta n yl e v e lo fw e a l t ha b o v ewt.
In conjunction with the assumption of nonincreasing absolute prudence of the utility
function, ˆ ct(wt) ≤ ct(wt) implies that
−u   (ˆ ct(wt))
u  (ˆ ct(wt))
≥
−u   (ct(wt))
u  (ct(wt))
. (24)
16This ﬁgure was generated using simulation programs written for Carroll (2001); these programs
are available on Carroll’s web page. The parameterization is as follows. The coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is ρ = 2, the time preference factor is β =0 .95, the gross interest factor is R =1 .04,
the growth factor for permanent income is G =1 .01. The stochastic process for transitory income for
ˆ c(w) involves a small probabilitly (0.005) that income will be zero; if it is not zero, then the transitory
shock is lognormally distribuuted with standard deviation of 0.2. Both rules reﬂect the limit as the
number of remaining periods of life approaches inﬁnity.
11wt
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Figure 3: Consumption Functions in the Baseline and Modiﬁed Cases

















































That is, concavity of ˆ ct(wt) along with limwt→∞ct(wt) − ˆ ct(wt) = 0 implies that the
absolute prudence of ˆ V (wt) is greater than the absolute prudence of V (wt).
Even when the absolute prudence of the utility function is constant, (26) is strict
whenever either (1) ˆ ct(·) is strictly concave at some level of wealth above wt (be-
cause, with weak concavity everywhere, strict concavity anywhere above wt implies
that ˆ c 
t(wt) >c  
t(wt)); or (2) ˆ ct(·) is strictly concave exactly at wt (because strict con-






t(wt) > 0). Conversely, if ˆ ct(·) is linear at wt and all higher
levels of wealth, (26) clearly holds with equality. We can summarize by saying that the
inequality (26) which expresses the result of the theorem is strict if and only if ˆ ct(·)i s
12strictly concave at or above wt.
What if ˆ c  
t(wt)a n dˆ V

t (wt) do not exist? In that case, greater prudence of ˆ V than





being a decreasing function of wt.17 By (17) and (18),
ˆ V   
t (wt)
V   
t (wt)
≡











t(wt), is clearly decreasing (it declines monotonically toward 1).
As for the ﬁrst factor, note that nonexistence of ˆ V

t (wt) and/or ˆ c

t(wt)d on o ts p r i n g








t (wt) is decreasing

















[u  (ct(wt))]2 . (29)









































      










      




Recall that ˆ c(wt) ≤ c(wt) (see ﬁgure 3), so the assumption of nonincreasing abso-
lute prudence tells us that the absolute prudence term on the LHS of (32) is greater





(wt). Hence both terms on the LHS are greater than or equal to the
corresponding terms on the RHS.
Thus, combining all of the factors involved in comparing the prudence of ˆ Vt(wt)t o
the prudence of Vt(wt), we have shown that the value function in the modiﬁed situation
will exhibit strictly greater prudence at any given wt than the value function in the
baseline situation if and only if ˆ ct(wt) is strictly concave at wt or at some level of wealth
above wt.
17To see this, use the implicit function theorem as in Pratt (1964), remembering that ˆ V  
t (wt) exists,
at least in the sense of right-hand and left-hand derivatives. Note that the theorem at hand is about
guaranteeing that concavifying the argument of V   o nt h ei n s i d ef r o mwt to c
−1
t (ˆ ct(wt)) will have the
same eﬀect as convexifying V   on the outside by some increasing convex function.
18It is possible that ˆ c

t(wt) may be discontinuous at speciﬁc values of wt, but in this case the
argument below goes through when taking either the right or the left derivatives.
134.2.2 The Exponential Case
The assumption that lim
wt→∞
ˆ ct(wt) − ct(wt) = 0 holds true if consumers have CRRA
utility and if the diﬀerence between the baseline and the modiﬁed situations is the
addition of either labor income risk or a liquidity constraint. However, if the consumer’s
utility function is of the CARA form, a labor income risk simply shifts the entire
consumption function down by an equal amount at all levels of wt, and so the level
of consumption in the modiﬁed case does not approach the level in the baseline case
as wealth approaches inﬁnity. We therefore need a modiﬁed version of the theorem to
apply in this case.
Corollary 1 Consider an agent who has a utility function with u (c) > 0, u  (c) < 0,
u   (c) ≥ 0 and nonincreasing absolute prudence −u   (c)/u  (c) in two diﬀerent situa-
tions. If the baseline situation has a neoclassical consumption function ct(wt) that is
linear, while the modiﬁed situation (indicated by a hat) has a concave neoclassical con-








ˆ ct(wt)−ct(wt) ≤ 0,
then the value function in the modiﬁed situation has greater absolute prudence at wt
than does the value function for baseline situation. The inequality of prudence is strict
if the modiﬁed consumption function is strictly concave at or above wt.
The proof of the corollary follows the proof of the main theorem, except where





t(wt)a n dt h a tˆ ct(wt) ≤ ct(wt); here we assume the second, and the ﬁrst fol-




(wt) = 0, and the fact that limˆ ct(wt) − ct(wt) ≤ 0.
4.2.3 The Quadratic Case
The quadratic case requires a somewhat diﬀerent approach. First, the limit wt →∞is
not as meaningful, since it goes beyond the bliss point. Second, since u   (·) = 0, strict
inequality between the prudence of ˆ V and the prudence of V will hold only at those
points where ˆ ct(·) is strictly concave.
To gain intuition for the quadratic problem, consider the Euler equation in the
second-to-last period of a lifetime that ends at T, under the assumption that there is





˜ βT ˜ RTu









˜ RT(wT−1 − cT−1)+˜ yT




ET−1[˜ βT ˜ R2
TwT−1]+ET−1[˜ βT ˜ RT ˜ yT]+κ(1 − ET−1[˜ βT ˜ RT])




As this equation indicates, in the quadratic case in the absence of liquidity con-
straints, the solution exhibits certainty equivalence with respect to risks to labor income
yT. An interesting subtlety is that even though the solution is linear in wealth, it does
not exhibit certainty equivalence with respect to rate-of-return risk, since the level of
consumption is related to the expectation of the square of the gross return, in a way
that implies that an increase in rate-of-return risk increases the marginal propensity to
consume. Finally, note that interactions between rate-of-return risk and income risk
can cause the consumption function to shift up or down by a potentially large amount.
Recall now from equation (28) that greater prudence of ˆ V (wt) occurs if
ˆ V   
t (wt)
V   
t (wt)
≡













is a decreasing function of wt (the second line follows because for quadratic utility u  (c)
is a constant).
Thus, prudence of the value function can be increased in the quadratic case only by
something that causes the marginal propensity to consume to decrease as wealth rises.
We will show below that in the quadratic case ˆ c

t(wt) experiences a discrete decline at
points where a future liquidity constraint potentially becomes binding. Note, however,
that an increase in rate-of-return risk, while it increases the level of the MPC compared
to the baseline case, does not induce a declining MPC in wealth: The MPC is higher
everywhere, but constant. Thus, rate-of-return risk does not induce an increase in
prudence in the quadratic case because u   (c) = 0 for quadratic utility functions (cf.
equation (32)).
Corollary 2 Consider an agent who has a quadratic utility function in two diﬀerent
situations. If the baseline situation has a neoclassical consumption function ct(wt)
that is linear over some range wt < ¯ ω, while the modiﬁed situation has consumption
function ˆ ct(wt) that exhibits a declining marginal propensity to consume for wt < ¯ ω,
19If there is a chance that wT could exceed the bliss point, then the kink point in the period-T
consumption rule can impart concavity to the period-T − 1 consumption rule.




The proof is simply to note that equation (37) is a declining function of wt only at
points where ˆ c

(wt) declines with wt.
5 The Recursive Propagation of Consumption Con-
cavity
The preceding sections make clear the signiﬁcance of a concave consumption function
for the prudence of the value function. Now, we provide conditions guaranteeing that
if the consumption function is concave in period t + 1, it will be concave in period t
and earlier, whatever the source of that concavity may be.
Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that in the absence of liquidity constraints, uncer-
tainty will cause the consumption function to become concave, and that this concavity
is propagated to earlier periods. The crucial element in the proof is to show that the
value function satisﬁes the diﬀerential inequality
V
   (w)V
 (w)/[(V
  (w))
2] ≥ k (38)
which holds if the utility function is in the HARA class, which that paper views as a
utility function satisfying
u




The HARA utility functions with positive, nonincreasing absolute prudence satisfy
this equation with k ≥ 1, quadratic utility satisﬁes it with k = 0, while the imprudent
HARA utility functions satisfy it with k<0.
For reasons that will become evident, it will be more convenient in this paper to
work with an alternative to (39) as our deﬁnition of the HARA class; here we view
the HARA class as those utility functions with nonnegative, nonincreasing absolute
prudence that (after normalization) satisfy either (1) u (c)=κ − c, with the domain
of c limited to c<κ(the quadratic case); (2) u (c)=( c − κ)−γ with γ ≥ 0a n dt h e
domain of c limited to c>κ(the main case); or (3) u (c)=e−ac with a>0 (the
exponential case).
Our goal in this section is to generalize the Carroll and Kimball (1996) results on
the propagation of consumption concavity to encompass the case where consumption
concavity may arise from the possibility of future liquidity constraints, rather than
from the presence of uncertainty. Since (as we show below) constraints can cause V   
to be discontinuous and V     to fail to exist entirely, the proof strategy of Carroll and
Kimball (1996) involving condition (38) will not work. Instead, the central issue in our
new proof will involve whether the value function exhibits what we will call “property
CC”. (The mnemonic is that “CC” stands for “concave consumption”.)
16Deﬁnition 1 Af u n c t i o nF(x) has property CC in relation to a utility function u(c)
with u  > 0, u   < 0 iﬀ F  (x)=u (ψ(x)) for some monotonically increasing concave
function ψ.
Thus, to say that property CC holds for a value function Vt(wt) is to say that there










so property CC holding for Vt(wt) is equivalent to having a concave consumption func-
tion ψ(wt)=ct(wt).20
It is easy to show by taking derivatives that if V (w) satisﬁes property CC, then
when V    (w) exists this condition reduces to the diﬀerential inequality (38), with k =0
in the quadratic case, k =1+( 1 /γ)i nt h em a i nc a s ea n dk = 1 in the exponential
case.
5.1 Horizontal Aggregation
First we establish that property CC of the value function is preserved through the
process we call “horizontal aggregation,” in which the utility from optimal current
consumption and the expected utility from optimal saving are aggregated to yield the
value function for current wealth.21
Lemma 1 If Ωt(st) has property CC in relation to u,t h e nVt(wt) has property CC in
relation to u, whether or not a liquidity constraint holds at the end of period t.
We begin by showing concavity in the case where there is no liquidity constraint;
we will then show that incorporating a current-period constraint does not disturb
concavity.
Designate the amount of consumption that would occur in the absence of a current
constraint c∗










20Remember that the envelope theorem depends only on being able to spend current wealth on
current consumption, so it holds whether or not there is a liquidity constraint.
21We call the intertemporal summing of utility ‘horizontal aggregation’ because it is easy to visualize
as the sum of a series of (expected) marginal values laid out horizontally through time. See Carroll
and Kimball (1996) for a more detailed justiﬁcation of this terminology.
17for some increasing concave ψt.T a k i n gu −1 of both sides yields
c
∗

















Since the inverse of an increasing concave function is an increasing convex func-
tion,22 ψ
−1
t is an increasing convex function. Since the sum of an increasing linear
function c∗
t and an increasing convex function ψ
−1
t (c∗
t) is an increasing convex function,
wt(c∗
t) is an increasing convex function. Finally, since the inverse of an increasing con-
vex function is an increasing concave function, c∗
t(wt) is an increasing concave function.
Thus, in the absence of a period-t liquidity constraint, property CC of Ωt(st) implies
property CC of Vt(wt).
Note now that when there is a liquidity constraint that requires actual consumption
ct to be less than total resources wt, actual consumption will be given by the lesser of
the unconstrained amount of consumption and the total amount of resources,
ct(wt)=m i n [ c
∗
t(wt),w t].
But the min operator applied to two concave functions preserves concavity. Hence
even when there is a binding constraint at the end of period t, the consumption rule is
concave, implying that Vt(wt) satisﬁes property CC.
5.2 Vertical Aggregation
Our next result states that property CC is preserved when expectations are taken.23
Lemma 2 If Vt+1(wt+1) has property CC and Rt+1 is always nonnegative, then the
function Ωt(st) deﬁned by equation (5) has property CC.
Unfortunately, separate proofs are needed for the three classes of HARA utility
functions speciﬁed above.
We begin by simplifying the problem by assuming that βt+1 = Rt+1 =1 . T h i si s
for expositional clarity only; the steps below all go through with stochastic βt+1 and
Rt+1.
22To see this, ﬂip an increasing concave function through the 45 deg line.
23We refer to the taking of expectations as ‘vertical aggregation’ because it is easy to visualize
as the vertical stacking and summation of all possible outcomes at a point in time, weighted by
their probabilities. Again, see Carroll and Kimball (1996) for a more detailed justiﬁcation of this
terminology.
185.2.1 The Quadratic Case
In the quadratic case, property CC of Vt+1(wt+1)m e a n st h a tV

t+1(wt+1)=κ−ct+1(wt+1)
for an increasing concave function ct+1(wt+1), implying that V

t+1(wt+1) is a decreasing
convex function. Since Ω

t(st) is a positive linear combination of decreasing convex
functions, it must itself be a decreasing convex function. Property CC of Ω







= κ − φt(st)
for some concave φt. But we can simply deﬁne φt(st)=κ − Ω

t(st) which is clearly an
increasing concave function because it is a constant minus a decreasing convex function.
Hence Ω

t(st) satisﬁes property CC with respect to a quadratic utility function.
5.2.2 The Main Case






















Concavity of ψ implies that
ψ(st + yt+1) ≥ pψ(s1 + yt+1)+( 1− p)ψ(s2 + yt+1) (50)










{pψ(s1 +˜ yt+1)+( 1− p)ψ(s2 +˜ yt+1)}
−γ  −1/γ .
(51)




















for γ>0i fat+1 and bt+1 are positive.24
24For a proof, see Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya (1967), page 146, Theorem 198, equation (6.13.2).
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pψ(s1 +˜ yt+1)+
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t(st)}−1/γ is concave, and Ωt(st) exhibits property CC.
5.2.3 The Exponential Case








for concave φt. Clearly, φt will be concave if −logΩ

t(st) is concave. Again assuming
βt+1 = Rt+1 = 1 for expositional clarity,
logΩ

t(st)=l o g Et[exp(−ψ(st +˜ yt+1))]. (57)
Property CC of Vt+1 implies concavity of ψ.T h u s ,
−ψ(st + yt+1) ≤− pψ(s1 + yt+1) − (1 − p)ψ(s2 + yt+1) (58)
logEt[e
−ψ(st+˜ yt+1)] ≤ logEt[e
−pψ(s1+˜ yt+1)−(1−p)ψ(s2+˜ yt+1)], (59)
where st = ps1 +( 1− p)s2.
The arithmetic-geometric mean inequality implies that for positive a and b,i f¯ a =















1−p] ≤ ¯ a
p¯ b
1−p. (61)
20Substituting in a = e−ψ(s1+yt+1) and b = e−ψ(s2+yt+1), this means that
Et[e










−pψ(s1+˜ yt+1)−(1−p)ψ(s2+˜ yt+1)] ≤ plogEt[e
−ψ(s1+˜ yt+1)]+( 1− p)logEt[e
−ψ(s2+˜ yt+1)].
(63)
Inequalities (59) and (63) together prove convexity of logΩ 
t(st) and concavity of
−logΩ 
t(st), so that Ωt(st) satisﬁes property CC.
5.3 Recursion
Repeated application of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 implies that if the value function in
period t exhibits property CC, then the value functions in all previous periods will also
exhibit property CC.
So far we have shown that weak concavity of the consumption function in period
t + 1 w ill be propagated into previous periods. We nowexamine howstrict concavity
is propagated.
5.4 Deﬁnition of Strict and Borderline Concavity at a Point
Deﬁnition 2 Af u n c t i o nF(x) has property strict CC over the interval between x1 and





for some increasing function ψ(x) which satisﬁes strict concavity over the interval from








for all x ∈ (x1,x 2).
Deﬁnition 3 Af u n c t i o nF(x) has property borderline CC over the interval from x1
and x2 if equation (64) holds with equality.
Deﬁnition 4 Af u n c t i o nF(x) has property CC (strict or borderline, respectively) at
ap o i n tx if there exists a δ such that if x ∈ (x1,x 2) and |x2−x1| <δthen the function
exhibits property CC (strict or borderline, respectively) over the interval from x1 to x2.
21Intuitively, these deﬁnitions are the formal apparatus necessary to handle value
functions that have a kink point at which the slope of the marginal value function
jumps from one value to another, as will occur (for example) in the transition between
levels of wealth where a constraint is not binding and where it is binding.
Note that if a function has property CC globally, then it will have either strict or
borderline CC at every point.
In order to understand our approach here it will be useful to step back for a moment
to previewthe next fewsteps in the paper. The next section w ill showthat, starting
with a setup in which there are no liquidity constraints, the introduction of a ﬁrst
liquidity constraint that binds at the end of period t+1 imparts strict concavity to the
consumption function at the period-t+1 level of wealth wt+1 = ω# where the constraint
begins to bind. What we are constructing in the present discussion is the apparatus
to determine howthat strict concavity at Vt(ω#) is propagated back to Ωt(st), Vt(wt),
and so forth in the absence of other constraints. Later in the paper (in section 6.5)
we examine what happens when additional constraints are added to the problem (for
example, a constraint that might bind at the end of period t).
5.5 Horizontal Aggregation of Strict and Borderline CC
Recall that we deﬁned ‘horizontal aggregation’ as the propagation of properties from
the end-of-period value function Ωt(st) to the maximized beginning-of-period value
function Vt(wt) . W eb e g i nwi t ha nΩ t(st) function that has property CC globally.
Given this, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If Ωt(st) exhibits property strict CC at level of saving st then Vt(wt) exhibits
property strict CC at the (unique) level of wealth wt such that optimal consumption at
that level of wealth yields st = wt − ct(wt).
If Ωt(st) exhibits strict CC at a speciﬁc point st, then for any s1 <s t <s 2 which





for some monotonically increasing function ψ(st)f o rwh i c h
ψ(ps1 +( 1− p)s2) >p ψ (s1)+( 1− p)ψ(s2) (66)
holds for 0 <p<1. Nowtake ψ−1 of both sides, yielding
ps1 +( 1− p)s2 <ψ
−1(pψ(s1)+( 1− p)ψ(s2)). (67)
22Now use the ﬁrst order condition from the maximization problem to ﬁnd the levels







c = ψ(s) (70)
ψ
−1(c)=s. (71)
Substituting (70) and (71) into (67) yields
p
s1       
ψ
−1(c1)+(1− p)
s2       
ψ
−1(c2) <ψ
−1(pc1 +( 1− p)c2) (72)
which means that ψ−1 satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a convex increasing function in a






Since ωt(ct) is the sum of the increasing convex function and an increasing linear
function, it is itself an increasing convex function, so by the deﬁnition of an increasing
convex function we have
pωt(c1)+( 1− p)ωt(c2) >ω t(pc1 +( 1− p)c2) (75)
ω
−1
t (pw1 +( 1− p)w2) <p c 1 +( 1− p)c2 (76)
ct(pw1 +( 1− p)w2) <p c t(w1)+( 1− p)ct(w2) (77)
where (76) follows from (75) because the inverse of an increasing convex function is
an increasing concave function and (77) follows because the deﬁnition of ω
−1
t implies
that it yields the level of consumption that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition of the
maximization problem for the given level of wealth. Thus, ct(wt) satisﬁes the deﬁnition
of a strictly concave function in the neighborhood of ct.
Lemma 3 was stated for points st at which Ωt(st) exhibits property strict CC. What
about points at which Ωt(st) exhibits property borderline CC? It turns out that the
25This ﬁrst order condition holds with equality if there are no constraints that apply in the current
period. It does not hold with equality at every point if there is a constraint in force at the end of the
current period, because in that case there will be a level of wealth ω# at which the constraint becomes
binding and below which all levels of wealth lead to zero savings; hence when there is a constraint
at the end of period-t there is not a one-to-one mapping from st to a unique corresponding ct and
wt. As noted above, we defer to later sections discussion of what happens when a such an additional
constraint is imposed.
23exact same steps can be employed, substituting equality signs for inequalities, to show
that if Ωt(st) exhibits borderline CC at st then Vt(wt) exhibits borderline CC at the
level of wealth wt that optimally leads to savings st.
The structure of the argument here is identical to the structure used for demon-
strating horizontal aggregation of nonstrict CC in section 5.1; the only complications
are the necessity to be careful about the deﬁnition of concavity and convexity over
intervals in a neighborhood, and the restriction to cases where there is no liquidity
constraint at the end of period-t.
5.6 Vertical Aggregation of Strict and Borderline CC
We are interested in whether strict CC applies to Ωt(st)a tp o i n tst.
Lemma 4 If from a given value of period-t savings st it is possible that a value of
period-t +1wealth wt+1 could arise at which the period-t +1value function exhibits
property strict CC, then Ωt(st) will exhibit property strict CC at st.
In the quadratic case, u (ct+1(wt+1)) = V  
t+1(wt+1)i sl i n e a ri nwt+1 except around
points where the consumption function exhibits strict concavity; around such points
strict concavity of ct+1(wt+1) implies strict convexity of u (ct+1(wt+1)). Thus Ω

t(st)i sa
positive linear combination of functions some of which are linear and some of which are
strictly convex at st, and since the sum of functions some of which are strictly convex
and some of which are linear is strictly convex, Ω

t(st) exhibits strict CC at st.
In the main case, suppose the stochastic income process consists of n possible values

















pi {(1/2)((ψ(st + δ + yi)+ψ(st − δ + yi))}
−γ (79)
if ψ(st+yi) is strictly concave for any one of the possible realizations of y. This means
that (51) will be a strict inequality if Vt+1 exhibits property strict CC at any level
of wt+1 reachable with a positive probability from st. But if (51) holds with strict
inequality, then the remaining chain of inequalities from (51) through (54) yields strict
concavity of {Ω

t(st)}−1/γ implying that Ωt exhibits property strict CC at point st.
In the exponential case, (59) will be a strict inequality for st if ψ(wt+1) is strict at
any wt+1 reachable from st, and again the remaining inequalities lead to the conclusion
that Ωt(st) has property strict CC at st.
24The foregoing arguments again hold in the case of a general stochastic distribution
for yt+1, βt+1 and Rt+1, with the additional implication that a general distribution for
yt+1 and stochasticity of Rt+1 makes more values of wt+1 reachable from a given st and
thus expands the number of values of st where Ωt(st) exhibits strict concavity.
5.7 Recursion for Strict and Borderline Concavity
Recursive application of horizontal and vertical aggregation of strict CC implies that
the value function Vs(ws) will exhibit property strict CC at any value of ws such that
there is any possibility in any future period (t>s )o fal e v e lo fw e a l t hwt occurring at
which Vt(wt) exhibits property strict CC.
6 Liquidity Constraints and Prudence in the Quadratic
Utility Case
Our results thus far have demonstrated that concavity of consumption functions and
prudence of value functions, once created, are propagated back through time to previous
periods’ consumption and marginal value functions. We now turn to the question of
how liquidity constraints can create strict convexity of the marginal value function.
6.1 Introducing the First Constraint
We begin with the question of how introducing a single liquidity constraint induces
precautionary saving when utility is quadratic. The purpose of this section is to show
that the introduction of a liquidity constraint that applies between the current period
and the next period convexiﬁes the marginal value function for the current period and
all prior periods, thus providing the key theoretical requirement for a precautionary
saving motive. The essence of the proof will be to show that a liquidity constraint
introduces a ‘kink’ in the marginal value function at the point where the constraint
binds, and that the kink will be propagated back to the marginal value functions in all
prior periods.26
Before proceeding to the proofs, we need a deﬁnition.




t ) as the “activation point” of the liquidity constraint




t(0), and deﬁne two potential values
µ1 = V

t (ω1) <µ # <µ 2 = V

t (ω2).
26For a simple analysis of how liquidity constraints cause a kink in the decision rule and thereby
induce precautionary saving in a three period model, see Besley (1995).
25That is, µ1 is the marginal value of wealth at some level of wealth ω1 above ω#
where the liquidity constraint is not binding, and µ2 is the marginal value of wealth at
some level of wealth below ω#, where the constraint is binding.
We are now in a position to state the following result:
Lemma 5 If the period utility function is quadratic and there are no liquidity con-
straints that could bind after period t +1 , the imposition of a liquidity constraint in
period t+1induces strict convexity of the period t+1marginal value function between
any two points ω1 and ω2 which lie on opposite sides of the “activation point” ω# of
the liquidity constraint.
Proof. Carroll and Kimball (1996) analyze the unconstrained problem for util-
ity functions in the HARA class, i.e. those functions which satisfy the condition
u   u /u
2 = k ≥ 0. Integrating this in the form u
u = k u
u yields the equation
u   = −Au





















or ˘ c (µ2)=(
µ2
µ1)−k (˘ c (µ1)) (this corresponds to equation (10) in Carroll and Kim-






In the quadratic utility case where there are no future constraints, similar results
can be derived for ˘ s (corresponding to Carroll and Kimball (1996) equation (11)),













Now recall that when there is a constraint that binds at the end of the current






 and ˘ s
 are negative and χ is a zero-one indicator function for whether µ>µ #.B u t



















26Combining this with (85) yields
˘ w

(µ2) > ˘ w

(µ1). (87)
Now recall that ˘ w(µ)=V
−1









(ω2). That is, the (negative) slope of the marginal value function is strictly shal-
lower at levels of wealth above ω# than at levels of wealth below ω#, which is precisely
the condition required for strict convexity of the marginal value function in the neigh-
borhood of ω#. The discrete change in the slope of V

t+1(wt+1)a twt+1 = ω# is the
formal deﬁnition of the ‘kink’ in the marginal value function.
Less formally, the logic here is essentially as follows. At any level of wealth below
the point ω# at which the constraint begins to bind, all incremental wealth is devoted
to extra current consumption. The decline in marginal value with extra wealth is
exactly as steep as the decline in marginal utility with extra consumption. This is
captured by the fact that, below the constraint cutoﬀ, ˘ c
(µ)= ˘ w
(µ). However, when
wealth is above ω#, an increment to wealth can be spread between the present and the
future, and the decline in total marginal value is therefore strictly less than when all
of the extra wealth had to be consumed in the present.
6.2 The Eﬀect of the Kink(s)
Now consider the eﬀect of the introduction of liquidity constraints on the response of
the expected marginal value function Ωt to risk. Our primary interest in this paper is
in the eﬀects on precautionary saving behavior of the introduction of risk to a situation
without risk. But analyzing the more general case of increases in risk helps to clarify
the theoretical issues, as well as being of interest in its own right.
We need to begin by deﬁning the support of a mean preserving spread in next
period’s wealth wt+1. To motivate our deﬁnition, consider the following example.
Recall the deﬁnition of the expected marginal value function,
Ω

t(st)=Et[˜ βt+1 ˜ Rt+1V

t+1(˜ wt+1)]. (88)
For expositional simplicity, suppose again that the interest rate and time preference
factors are nonstochastic and that both are equal to one, R = β = 1. Suppose further
that income shocks can only take the form of a two-point mean-zero risk. That is, if















We wish to consider the eﬀects on the marginal utility of saving of an increase in
the degree of uncertainty about yt+1, which corresponds to an increase in the size of
27ν. Suppose that the marginal value function for period t+1 takes the piecewise linear
form depicted in ﬁgure 4, corresponding to the form that we have just shown arises
in a quadratic utility problem with a single liquidity constraint that applies in period
t + 1, with an activation point ω#.
Consider the value of ending period t with a speciﬁc amount of savings st = A
under the initial assumption that income in period t + 1 is nonstochastically equal to















Now consider the eﬀect of increasing the size of the income risk to ν =   where
 >0 but A +  <ω #. In this case, as the ﬁgure illustrates, the addition of the risk







t+1(A −  )+V
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because the expected marginal value function V

t+1(wt+1) is linear over the entire range
spanned by the possible values of wt+1 that arise from saving st = A.
Now consider the eﬀect of a larger risk η> where A+η>ω #. It is clear from the
ﬁgure that increasing the size of the risk from   to η increases the expected marginal
value of saving amount A, i.e. ˆ Ω

t(A,η) is strictly greater than ˆ Ω

t(A, ).
Deﬁne the level of initial period-t wealth that would have resulted in the optimal
amount of period-t savings being A in the absence of income risk as w0 =˘ wt(ˆ Ω

t(A,0)).
Now note that since the increase in risk from ν =0t oν =   has no eﬀect on the
marginal utility of savings (ˆ Ω

t(A,0) = ˆ Ω

t(A, )), the ﬁrst order conditions of the prob-
lem continue to be satisﬁed after this increase in risk at ct = w0 − A and st = A,s o
period-t consumption does not change in response to the increase in risk from 0 to  .
However, when the risk is increased further to ν = η, the marginal utility associated
with saving amount A now becomes strictly higher than it was before. This means that
the problem’s ﬁrst order conditions for initial wealth w0 are no longer satisﬁed at the
original level of period-t consumption. In order to satisfy the FOC’s, it is necessary to
ﬁnd a new level of consumption that generates a marginal utility partway toward the
new higher marginal utility of saving - which is to say, the level of consumption that
now satisﬁes the FOC’s will have to be lower. Thus, the increase in risk from   to η
induces a (precautionary) decline in the level of consumption in period t.
Note that the critical issue is whether the additional risk ‘interacts’ with the kink
at the activation point. Consider ﬁgure 5. In this case the original situation involves
an equal chance of wt+1 ending up at point A or at point B. Now consider again the
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Figure 5: Example of When Adding Risk ˜   Does Not Induce Prudence
eﬀect of adding a small mean zero risk ±  to each of the original outcomes A and B.
Although the two points A and B are on opposite sides of the kink, the change in the
risk does not interact with the kink. The expected marginal value conditional on either
A or B does not change, and so the overall expected marginal value does not change.
We now deﬁne the formal concept of the support of a mean-preserving spread,
which allows us to say when a mean-preserving spread (including the special case of a
newly introduced mean-zero risk) interacts with a kink.
Deﬁnition 6 In an interval [w,w] such that F1(w)=F2(w)=0and F1(w)=F2(w)=
1, let the distribution F2 be a mean preserving spread of F1; that is, if we deﬁne G1(w)=   w
w F1(ω)dω and G2(w)=
  w
w F2(ω)dω, then G2(w) ≥ G1(w) and G2(w)=G1(w).
Deﬁnition 7 The open support of the mean preserving spread is the set {w|G2(w) >
G1(w)}. The support is the closure of the open support.
In ﬁgure 4, the support of the mean preserving spread going from ν =0t oν =   is the
region from A−  to A+ , and the support of the mean preserving spread going from
ν =0t oν = η is the region from A−η to A+η. The support of the mean-preserving
spread caused by going from ν =   to ν = η is the union of the region from A − η
30to A −   and the region from A +   to A + η. In ﬁgure 5, the support of the mean
preserving spread is the union of the region from A −   to A +   and the region from
B −   to B +  .
We are now in position to state the critical lemma.27
Lemma 6 For a given level of saving st,l e tΨ be the open support of a mean preserving
spread in wt+1,a n dl e tWt+1 be the set of points at which V

t+1(wt+1) exhibits strict CC.
Then the expected marginal value of saving Ω
(st) is strictly increased by the mean
preserving spread iﬀ Ψ ∩W  = ∅.
Proof. The lemma is proven using integration by parts. Dropping the t+1 subscripts
for clarity, the change in the expectation of next period’s value function as a result of
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This integral expresses the proposition of the lemma, because the integral will be
positive only if there is some set of points at which G2(w) >G 1(w)a n ddV   (w) > 0.
These are the points where the mean preserving spread interacts with the convexity of
the marginal value function. Note that the integrals here are well deﬁned even if V    is
discontinuous.28
With this lemma in hand, the actual theorem is trivial, simply by focusing on the
introduction of a mean-zero risk as a special case of mean preserving spreads.
27In the proof below, choose w strictly above the suprema of both Ψ and W and w strictly below
the inﬁma of both Ψ and W.
28Figure 5 gives the essential intuition for how the concept of the support of a mean preserving spread
can diﬀer from the convex hull of the support of a risk, in the following sense. For a mean preserving
spread, since G2(ω) ≥ G1(ω), when a point ω0 is not in the support of a mean preserving spread,
31Theorem 2 The introduction of a mean-zero risk in period t+1 will induce a (precau-
tionary) increase in saving st at a given level of wealth wt even if utility is quadratic, so
long as the initially optimal level of saving st before introduction of the risk is such that
the introduction of the risk leads to a probability 0 <p<1 that the liquidity constraint
will bind in period t +1 .
Proof: By the previous lemma, the introduction of the risk increases the expected
marginal utility of saving, which induces the consumer to save more and consume less.
As we showed in Lemma 5, strict convexity of the marginal value function is gener-
ated by transition from a liquidity constraint being binding to non-binding as wealth
rises. The introduction of a mean-zero risk raises the expected marginal value of sav-
ing in period t if the outcome of that risk aﬀects the probability that the period t +1
liquidity constraint will bind.
To restate in a slightly diﬀerent way, the lemma shows that, from any level of
wealth such that after the risk is introduced the liquidity constraint will bind for bad
outcomes of the risk but will not bind for better outcomes, the introduction of the
risk increases the marginal utility of saving Ω

(st) by interacting with the convexity
of V  
t+1. Furthermore, since we are considering the case where utility is quadratic and
where there are no liquidity constraints beyond period t + 1, the convexity of V  
t+1 all
comes from the activation point, so the introduction of a risk that does not span the
activation point does not aﬀect the marginal utility of saving. For the more complex
case of a mean-preserving spread as opposed to the introduction of a risk, there is no
substitute for the concept of the support of a mean-preserving spread.
The theorem just proven is somewhat backwards: we set out to show that the
addition of liquidity constraints induces precautionary saving, but theorem 2 starts
out with liquidity constraints and adds a risk. Of course, the bottom line is that when
both constraints and risks are present, there will be a precautionary saving motive, but
when only risks and no constraints are present quadratic utility implies that there is
no precautionary motive, so theorem 2 leads trivially to the theorem that we initially
set out to prove.
Theorem 3 The imposition of a liquidity constraint that binds in period t+1induces
precautionary saving for consumers in period t at all levels of wealth wt such that at
the optimal level of saving st the probability that the constraint will bind depends on
the outcome of the risk.
G2(ω0)=G1(ω0), and G2 is tangent to G1 at ω0. The tangency implies either that F1(ω0)=F2(ω0)








0 )]. This means that
both the distribution F1 and the distribution F2 can be sliced into two parts at ω0 such that the two
upper parts have the same mass, the two lower parts have the same mass, the upper part of F2 is a
mean preserving spread of the upper part of F1 and the lower part of F2 is a mean preserving spread
of the lower part of F1. Thus, the implication of the theorem is that if you have a kink that is between
two separate mean preserving spreads, those mean preserving spreads will not interact with that kink
to create an increase in the marginal utility of saving.
32The next question we want to address is the extent to which the precautionary
saving motive induced in period t propagates back to prior periods, in the absence of
further liquidity constraints.
6.3 Main Theorem
Theorem 4 Introducing a liquidity constraint that applies in period t+1 to the quadratic
utility optimization problem induces a strictly convex marginal value function in period
s ≤ t at any level of wealth ws such that, when the constraint is introduced, there is a
probability 0 <p<1 that the constraint will bind in period t +1 .
Proof. First, note that, by Lemma 5, introducing the liquidity contraint in period
t + 1 imparts a kink to the marginal value function V

t+1 at the point ω# where the
constraint begins to bind. Deﬁne the set St as the set of points st such that if the
period-t consumer saves st there is some probability 0 <p<1 that the constraint will
bind in period t + 1. Then by Lemma 4, Ω

t is strictly convex at all points in St.N o w
for each point st ∈S t ﬁnd the corresponding level of initial wealth such that the level
of saving st is optimal, i.e. wt − ct(wt)=st, and call the full set of such points Wt.
Then by Lemma 3, V

t is convex at all points in Wt. Continued iteration using these
lemmas demonstrates that for any s ≤ t, V  
s(ws) is strictly convex at any value of ws
such that there is both a positive probability that the period t+1 constraint will bind,
and a positive probability that it will not bind.
Note that if the risks have discrete distributions, with quadratic utility this recursion
yields a piecewise linear marginal value function for all s ≤ t, where the kinks are all
associated with the points at which the future liquidity constraint begins to bind.
Continuous risk distributions tend to smooth out the kinks.
6.4 Introducing Many Liquidity Constraints and Background
Risks All at Once
The theorems above indicate that adding many liquidity constraints and background
risks simultaneously will make the consumption function concave. If the consumption
function was linear to begin with, by making the consumption function concave, the
addition of many liquidity constraints and background risks unambiguously raises the
prudence of the value function. In the simplest case of a quadratic utility function, the
addition of many liquidity constraints and background risks makes prudence positive-an
unambiguous increase when prudence was zero to begin with. This increase in prudence
implies that all of the liquidity constraints and background risks as a group make
consumption and saving react more strongly to the primary risk. Since interactions,
as a matter of logic, go both ways, this also implies that adding liquidity constraints
and background risks has a bigger negative eﬀect on consumption if there is a primary











Figure 6: How a Liquidity Constraint Today Can ‘Hide’ A Future Constraint
6.5 Does Adding Successive Constraints Further Increase Pru-
dence?
A natural next question is whether adding successive further constraints after the ﬁrst
one necessarily intensiﬁes the precautionary saving motive.29 The surprising answer, in
general, is no. The reason is that if a constraint exists in period t+n which convexiﬁes
the marginal value function at point wt = ω, introducing a constraint that applies in
period t can ‘hide’ the kink in the initial period-t value function caused by the period
t + n constraint. This point is illustrated by ﬁgure 6.
The curve labelled V

t (wt) reﬂects the marginal value function if there are no future
liquidity constraints. V

t (wt|ct+1 ≤ wt+1) is the marginal value function when there is a
constraint in period t+1. As we argued above, the constraint in period t+1 introduces
a kink into the marginal value function in period t + 1 and all earlier periods. In the
ﬁgure, the point labelled ω designates the level of wt at which the constraint in period
t + 1 kinks the period-t marginal value function. V

t (wt|ct+1 ≤ wt+1,c t ≤ wt)i st h e
29This is, in eﬀect, a question about a triple cross-derivative between the primary risk and two
(sets of) liquidity constraints and/or background risks, which helps explain why the question and its
answer are more subtle than one might initially guess.
34marginal value function when there are constraints in both period t and period t +1 .
The point of the ﬁgure is that when the period-t constraint is not in force but the
period-t + 1 constraint is in force (that is, for V

t (wt|ct+1 ≤ wt+1)), the fact that the
period-t marginal value function is kinked at point ω implies that the marginal value
function exhibits prudence at the kink point ω, as argued above. However, when both
constraints are in force, the marginal value function (now V

t (wt|ct+1 ≤ wt+1,c t ≤ wt))
is linear in the neighborhood of ω. Thus the imposition of the constraint in period
t has the eﬀect of ‘hiding’ the constraint at t + 1, and so adding the new constraint
reduces the prudence of the value function with respect to risks around wealth level ω.
The intuition is as follows. In the absence of the period-t constraint, for levels of
wealth wt <ω ,t h ep e r i o d - t consumer would borrow enough from period t+1 that the
period t + 1 consumer would become constrained (that is why the period-t marginal
value function is kinked at ω). Imposing the period-t liquidity constraint prevents
period-t consumers with wt <ωfrom borrowing so much and causes such consumers
to enter period t + 1 with enough wealth that the liquidity constraint between t +1
and t + 2 is no longer relevant.
Note a crucial feature of the liquidity constraint that ‘hides’ the subsequent con-
straint: the ‘hiding’ happens for points at which the marginal value function increases
as a consequence of the introduction of the new constraint. Since an increase in the
marginal value function corresponds to an increase in the value of saving, the new
constraint unambiguously increases total saving, even though it reduces precautionary
saving.
6.6 The Bliss Point and Consumption Concavity in the Quadratic
Case
To this point in our analysis of the quadratic utility case, we have implicitly been
assuming we are examining behavior at levels of wealth low enough that there is no
possibility future wealth will ever be large enough for consumption to equal the bliss
point beyond which extra consumption yields negative utility. However, we are now
in a position to understand that this is an implausible assumption if there are many
periods of life remaining.
The crucial insight here comes from considering the consumption function in the
last period of life T. The consumption rule will be
cT(wT)=m i n [ wT,κ] (96)
where κ is the bliss point. But this is obviously an example of a strictly concave
consumption function, with concavity at the point wT = κ.T h u s , cT−1(wT−1) will
be strictly concave at any level of wealth such that there is a possibility (however
remote) that wT will exceed κ. Similarly for cT−2(wT−2), and so forth. So even in the
baseline case for quadratic utility, if there is future uncertainty (in either labor income
35or the rate of return) the consumption function cT−n(ω) will be strictly concave over
an ever-expanding range of values of ω as the number of periods remaining in life n
increases.
The upshot is that even the most extreme compromise economists have been willing
to make for the sake of tractability (quadratic utility with no liquidity constraints) does
not yield the desired payoﬀ of a linear consumption function if there is any substantial
amount of uncertainty and there are many periods of life remaining, except for levels of
wealth so far below the bliss point that even the most wildly favorable realizations of
uncertainty could not result in suﬃcient wealth ever to permit blisspoint consumption.
We hope that this will help extinguish any remaining embers of enthusiasm for the use
of quadratic utility functions as a tool for practical economic modelling.
7 Liquidity Constraints and Prudence for CRRA
Utility
We now turn to the question of whether adding a ﬁrst liquidity constraint to a previ-
ously unconstrained optimization problem with risky future income globally increases
the prudence of the value function for problems where the initial value function already
exhibits positive prudence. Once again, the answer is not necessarily. The reason, once
again, is that a liquidity constraint can ‘hide’ certain points on the marginal value func-
tion that are exposed if the constraint is not present.
We consider a problem in which a consumer with CRRA utility faces a future income
risk but no future liquidity constraints. Note ﬁrst that the Inada condition of the utility
function will necessarily induce an Inada condition in the value function Vt+1(w)a t
some point w, i.e. ∃ w such that limw↓w V

t+1(w)=∞.30 Suppose for simplicity that
the time preference and interest factors are equal to one (the result generalizes to the
case of stochastic interest and time preference rates considered above).
Consider ﬁrst consumer A for whom income in period t + 1 is nonstochastically
equal to y, and who has amount of wealth wt in period t. Suppose that this consumer
faces a liquidity constraint that prevents borrowing against future income. Consumer






t + y) (97)
s.t. sA
t = wt − cA
t ≥ 0.
Now consider consumer B, a non-liquidity-constrained consumer with the same
u(ct), Vt+1, and initial wealth wt but whose income has a small probability p of going
30The argument in this section actually applies to any utility function with an Inada condition; we
use CRRA as our example because of its familiarity.
36to w next period. If this event does not occur, then income will be the same as in the






t + w)+( 1− p)Vt+1(sB
t + y) (98)
s.t. sB
t = wt − cB
t .
We wish to show that, as the probability p of the bad shock approaches zero, the
behavior of the unconstrained consumer facing the risk becomes arbitrarily close to the
behavior of the constrained consumer.
First, consider the case in which the constrained consumer’s initial wealth wt is large
enough so that this consumer would, if unconstrained, have saved a positive amount.
That is, consider the case where the liquidity constraint does not bind. In this case the
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Since saving is determined uniquely by the FOC’s, this implies that limp↓0 sB
t = sA
t ,
i.e. as p approaches zero the saving of the consumer facing the risk becomes arbitrarily
close to the saving of the constrained consumer.
Now, consider the case where consumer A would be constrained. By the deﬁnition
of ‘constrained,’ this consumer spends her full available resources wt, and the marginal






Note ﬁrst that if consumer B were to save exactly 0 and then experienced the bad
income shock in period t + 1, consumer B’s expected utility would be −∞. Hence
saving an amount less than or equal to 0 is ruled out.
What we need to show now is that if consumer B were to choose to save any amount
greater than 0, say δ>0, then as p approaches zero there will always come some point
at which consumer B could improve her utility by saving less.
Begin by noting that if consumer B saves ﬁxed amount δ (rather than the 0 that A







t+1(y+δ). But we know from equation (99)
and from concavity of the utility function that u (wt−δ) >u  (wt) >V

t+1(y). Hence we
know that as p ↓ 0 there must come a point at which the consumer can improve her
total utility by shifting some resources from the future to the present, i.e. by saving
less. Since this argument holds for any δ>0, this argument demonstrates that as p
goes to zero there is no positive level of saving which would make the consumer better
oﬀ. Hence saving goes to zero.
Thus, we have shown that whether the two consumers start with a wealth position
at which the constrained consumer would like to save, or start with a wealth position
37at which the constrained consumer would not like to save, as p goes to zero the level
of saving of the unconstrained consumer facing the risk becomes arbitrarily close to
the level of saving of the constrained consumer. Hence, in the limit this kind of risk is
indistinguishable from a liquidity constraint.
We showed in section 6 that introducing a liquidity constraint introduces a ‘kink’ in
the value function at the point ω# where the constraint begins to bind. The arguments
in that section are easy to extend to the CRRA case considered here. Recalling that
the prudence of the value function is deﬁned as −V

V
 it is clear that the discrete jump
in the value of V
 at the kink point implies inﬁnite prudence exactly at the kink.
Now consider the implications of these arguments. In the limit as p ↓ 0 a future
risk with the character described above becomes indistinguishable from a liquidity
constraint in the implied consumption function, and therefore in the implied marginal
value function V  (ω)=u (ct(ω)). Hence introducing a liquidity constraint in period
t when there is a preexisting risk of this kind is essentially indistinguishable from
introducing a second liquidity constraint when there is already a preexisting constraint.
There is no reason that a point which was a kink before imposing the new liquidity
constraint will necessarily remain a kink point after imposing the new constraint. Since
the prudence of the value function at the kink point was inﬁnite before the constraint
was introduced and may be ﬁnite after the constraint is introduced, the introduction
of the constraint could reduce the prudence of the value function at the level of wealth
corresponding to the kink. This period’s constraint can ‘hide’ the eﬀects of future risk
by making the consumer save so much that those future risks are less consequential
(from the standpoint of their eﬀects on precautionary saving) than before the liquidity
constraint was introduced.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The central message of this paper is that the eﬀects of precautionary saving and liquid-
ity constraints are very similar to each other, because both spring from the concavity of
the consumption function. The paper provides an explanation the apparently contadic-
tory results that have emerged from simulation studies, which have sometimes seemed
to indicate that constraints intensify precautionary saving motives, and sometimes have
found constraints and precautionary behavior to be substitutes.
Our results may have important applications even beyond the traditional consump-
tion/saving problem in which the results were derived. The precautionary-saving eﬀect
of liquidity constraints may apply in many circumstances where a decision-maker faces
the possibility of future liquidity constraints which raise the marginal value of an extra
dollar of cash. Thus, ﬁrms which are not currently liquidity constrained may engage
in precautionary saving if they believe there is some risk that constraints may bind in
the future. Governments that worry about whether they will always be able to borrow
38on international markets may engage in precautionary saving even in periods when
they are unconstrained. The logic could even apply to central banks charged with the
responsibility of maintaining stable exchange rate regimes; the possibility of a run on
the currency might induce ‘precautionary’ holdings of international reserves that are
larger than a risk-neutral central bank would hold. Of course, these are all ideas that
have appeared, at least informally and sometimes formally, in the relevant literatures.
But this paper provides a general logic which can be applied to clarify precisely when
and why one should expect such eﬀects to emerge.
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